Robust Principles: Architectural Design Principles for Adversarially Robust CNNs

ShengYun Peng¹ https://shengyun-peng.github.io/ Weilin Xu² https://xuweilin.org/ Corv Cornelius² https://dxoig.mn/ Matthew Hull¹ https://matthewdhull.github.io Kevin Li¹ https://www.kevinyli.com/ Rahul Duggal¹ http://www.rahulduggal.com/ Mansi Phute¹ https://mphute.github.io/ Jason Martin² iason.martin@intel.com Duen Horng Chau¹ https://faculty.cc.gatech.edu/~dchau

- ¹ Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA, USA
- ² Intel Corporation Hillsboro, OR, USA

Abstract

We aim to unify existing works' diverging opinions on how architectural components affect the adversarial robustness of CNNs. To achieve our goal, we synthesize a suite of generalizable robust architectural design principles: (a) optimal range for *depth* and *width* configurations, (b) preferring *convolutional* over *patchify* stem stage, and (c) robust residual block design by adopting squeeze and excitation blocks, and non-parametric smooth activation functions. Through extensive experiments across a wide spectrum of *dataset scales, adversarial training methods, model parameters*, and *network design spaces*, our principles consistently and markedly improve AutoAttack accuracy: 1–3 percentage points (pp) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, and 4–9 pp on ImageNet. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/poloclub/robust-principles.

1 Introduction

Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and Transformers are staples in computer vision research [11, 15], but they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [13, 31, 40], and adversarial




Figure 1: We synthesize a suite of generalizable architectural design principles to robustify CNNs, spanning a network's macro and micro designs: (A) optimal range for depth and width configurations, (B) preferring *convolutional* over *patchify* stem stage, and (C) robust residual block design by adopting squeeze and excitation blocks, and non-parametric smooth activation functions. The principles consistently and markedly improve AutoAttack accuracy for CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet over the wide spectrum of AT methods, model parameters, and network design spaces.

training (AT) is the most effective way to improve their robustness [29]. While CNNs and Transformers have comparable clean accuracy [27, 47], there is a disparity between the two families in robustness research. AT has robustified a wide range of Transformers [6, 31]. Yet, for CNNs, wide residual networks (WRN) [53], proposed back in 2016, is still the most studied architecture in AT research [19, 45].

Although a variety of instructions have been proposed to enhance the robustness of WRN, there are still conflicting opinions on how architectural components impact the overall robustness. For example, recent research [19, 20] explored how scaling depth and width might be correlated with improved adversarial robustness; however, Mok et al. [32] suggested such a relationship was unclear. As another example, for micro block design, Xie et al. [51] and Bai et al. [2] found smooth activation functions improved robustness, but Huang et al. [20] suggested that the performance was dependent on AT settings. Furthermore, as most existing robust architecture research experimented only on the small-scale CIFAR-10 [19, 20, 31, 32], it was unclear whether such findings might generalize to large-scale datasets, e.g., ImageNet [7]. For example, while prior work suggested that a straightforward application of squeeze and excitation (SE) hurts robustness on CIFAR [20], we find such a modification, in fact, *improves* robustness on ImageNet (Sec. 4.3.1). Similarly, while previous work suggested that parametric activation functions are more robust than non-parametric versions on CIFAR [5], we find the reverse holds true on ImageNet (Sec. 4.3.2). The divergent observations provide strong motivation for us to seek a suite of unified generalizable design principles that can enhance the adversarial robustness of CNNs.

To accomplish our goal, we survey and distill four key architectural components underpinning state-of-the-art (SOTA) CNNs and Transformers that boost adversarial robustness. These components span a network's macro and micro designs: *depth and width, stem stage, SE block,* and *activation.* Different from previous research on robust architectures that solely relies on the small-scale CIFAR-10, we explore the AT of all four components on the largescale ImageNet and evaluate on its full validation set. Through extensive experiments over the wide spectrum of *dataset scales, AT methods, model parameters,* and *network design spaces,* we make the following key contributions:

1. A suite of generalizable robust architectural design principles for CNNs (Fig. 1):

(a) Optimal Range for Depth and Width Configurations. Despite the popularity of 4-stage residual networks on ImageNet, existing exploration has been constrained to 3-stage designs [19, 20]. We discover a flexible depth and width scaling rule that does not place a restriction on the total number of stages, and we verify its generalizability and optimality through extensive experiments. (Sec. 4.1)

(b) Convolutional over Patchify Stem Stage. Convolutional stem and patchify stem are commonly used in CNNs and Transformers to downsample input images due to the redundancy inherent in natural images. Convolutional stem uses overlapped convolution kernel to slide the input image, while patchify stem patchifies the input image into $p \times p$ non-overlapping patches. We discover that convolutional stem, especially with a postponed downsampling design, outperforms patchify stem due to its less-aggressive stride-two downsampling and overlapped convolution kernels. (Sec. 4.2)

(c) Robust Residual Block Design. Our investigations on how SE block and activations affect robustness present new findings on ImageNet that differ from previous research on CIFAR. Through a hyperparameter sweep, we find the reduction ratio r in SE block is negatively correlated with robustness, a new discovery not previously reported as prior work was based on a fixed r [20]. We also confirm that non-parametric smooth activations consistently improve robustness on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet. (Sec. 4.3)

2. Consistent and marked improvements on adversarial robustness.

We verify the generalization of the three design principles across a wide spectrum of *dataset scales* (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [23], ImageNet [7]), *AT methods* (standard adversarial training (SAT) [29], TRADES [54], Fast-AT [46], MART [43], and diffusion-augmented AT [45]), *model parameters* (from 26M to 267M), and *network design spaces* (variants of WRN [53] and ResNet [15]). Our experiments demonstrate that all design principles consistently and markedly improve AutoAttack (AA) accuracy by 1–3 percentage points (pp) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 — boosting even the SOTA diffusion-augmented AT [45] by such amounts — and 4–9 pp on ImageNet. In particular, our robustified WRN-70-16 boosts the AA accuracy by 1.31 pp (65.02% \rightarrow 66.33%) on CIFAR-10, and 0.96 pp (37.77% \rightarrow 38.73%) on CIFAR-100. On ImageNet, the AA accuracy is boosted by 6.48 pp (39.78% \rightarrow 46.26%) through robustified ResNet-101, and 6.94 pp (42.00% \rightarrow 48.94%) through robustified WRN-101-2. Our findings unify prior works' diverging opinions on how architectural components affect robustness and highlight the benefits of exploring intrinsically robust architectural components.

2 Related Work

Adversarial training (AT). AT is an effective approach to defending against adversarial attacks [13]. Madry *et al.* [29] formulated SAT as a min-max optimization framework. Given dataset samples (x_i, y_i) , network f_{θ} and loss function \mathcal{L} , the optimization is formulated as:

$$\underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmin}} \mathbb{E}_{(x_i, y_i) \sim \mathbb{D}} \left[\max_{x'} \mathcal{L} \left(f_{\theta}, x', y \right) \right], \tag{1}$$

The inner adversarial example x' aims to find the perturbation of a given data point x that achieves a high loss and is generated on the fly during the training process. Since then,

multiple variants of SAT are proposed [1, 9, 10, 44, 48]. Our architectural research is complementary to these works on AT methods. We train on diverse AT methods, *e.g.*, SAT [29], Fast-AT [46], TRADES [54], MART [43], and diffusion-augmented AT [45] to verify that our design principles unanimously improve robustness agnostic to the training recipe.

Robust Architectures. Here we provide a brief overview of related research on robust architectures, and the extended version is in Sec. A in supplementary materials. Our key advancement over existing works is a suite of three robust architectural design principles verified on diverse dataset scales, AT methods, model parameters, and design spaces. A few research studied the impact of architectural designs on adversarial robustness [14, 34, 38, 50]. For macro network design, Huang *et al.* [19] and Huang *et al.* [20] led the exploration of the correlations between robustness improvement and scaling depth and width, but Mok *et al.* [32] suggested such a relationship was unclear. For micro block design, smooth [2, 51] and parameterized [5] activation functions can largely improve robustness on CIFAR, but Huang *et al.* [20] found the performance was dependent on AT settings. There was no clear consensus on how architectural components affect adversarial robustness. More importantly, most conclusions are drawn on CIFAR with WRN's basic block design. It was unclear whether such existing robust architectures generalize to large-scale datasets or other network design spaces. Our work provides conclusive evidence that unifies prior works' diverging opinions on how architectural components affect robustness.

3 Preliminaries

This section describes the setups for comparing CNNs and Transformers in terms of architectural design space, training techniques, and adversarial attacks.

Architectural Design Skeleton. Fig. 1 provides the CNN skeleton that supports modifications of different architectural components in our study. Specifically, the skeleton consists of a stem stage, *n* body stages, and a classification head. A typical body stage has multiple residual blocks, and the block type is either basic (two 3×3 convolutions) or bottleneck ($1 \times 1, 3 \times 3$, and 1×1 convolutions). For stage *i*, denote *depth D_i* as number of blocks, and *width W_i* as channels in 3×3 convolution. The downsampling factor is 1 in the first block of stage 1, and 2 in the first block of stage 2 to *n*. Unless otherwise specified, the default operations in each block are rectified linear unit (ReLU) and batch normalization (BN).

Training Techniques. We use five AT recipes: Fast-AT [46], SAT [29], TRADES [54], MART [43], and diffusion-augmented AT [45]. The architectural exploration is conducted on ImageNet [7], and we apply the same training method so that the performance difference between models can only be attributed to the difference in architectures. Due to the size of ImageNet and the slow speed of AT, we use Fast-AT [46] with a cyclic learning rate [39] and mixed-precision arithmetic [30]. After finalizing the architectural design principles, we train all models with diverse AT methods on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [23] and ImageNet [7] to verify that our designs can consistently improve robustness regardless of the training recipe. **Adversarial Attacks.** Projected gradient descent (PGD) [29] and AA [3] are used to evaluate adversarial robustness. PGD is a white-box attack with complete access to network architectures and parameters. For PGD, we provide a comprehensive investigation on the full ImageNet validation set with attack budgets $\varepsilon \in \{2,4,8\}/255$ and max steps $i = \{10,50,100\}$, denoted as PGD^{*i*}- ε . AA is an ensemble of one black-box and three white-box attacks. The attack budget is $\varepsilon = 4/255$ on ImageNet [4], and $\varepsilon = 8/255$ on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 [19, 20] for AA. All attacks are ℓ_{∞} bounded. When exploring individual architectural components, we use 10-step PGD ($PGD^{10}-\varepsilon$) for fast evaluations.

4 Robust Architectural Design Principles

Our strategy to explore the four robust architectural components is through comparing SOTA CNNs and Transformers. These components span a network's macro and micro designs: depth and width (Sec. 4.1), stem stage (Sec. 4.2), squeeze and excitation block (Sec. 4.3.1), and activation (Sec. 4.3.2), as shown in Fig. 1. To exclude the effect of model complexity [29] and provide a fair comparison [2], we focus our investigation on the regime of ResNet-50 with \sim 26M parameters in this section. In the next section (Sec. 5), we verify the generalization of these principles through extensive experiments over the wide spectrum of dataset scales, AT methods, parameter budgets, and network design spaces.

4.1 Optimal Range for Depth and Width Configurations

Macro network design involves the distribution of depth and width in each stage. Shifted windows Transformer (Swin Transformer) [26] regulates the stage compute ratio as 1:1:3:1 or 1:1:9:1. On the CNN side, ConvNeXt [27] reshuffles depths in all stages according to Swin Transformer and finds this design improves clean accuracy. RegNet [36] introduces a linear parameterization to assign network depth and width. As network depth and width are competing for resources when the parameter budget is fixed, it is important to study the impact of depth and width on adversarial robustness. We draw inspiration from prior robustness research to develop a more generalized scaling rule. Huang *et al.* [19] found reducing depth or width at the last stage of WRN reduces the Lipschitz constant, thus improving robustness. Huang *et al.* [20] proposed a fixed scaling ratio for WRN [53] on CIFAR-10.

Existing explorations are constrained to 3-stage networks, whereas 4-stage residual networks are more commonly used on ImageNet. Thus, instead of studying a fixed depth and width configuration in each stage, we aim to provide a flexible compound scaling rule of the relationship between robustness and total depths and widths. Define the width-depth (WD) ratio of a *n*-stage network as the average of comparing W_i to D_i in stage *i*:

WD ratio =
$$\frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \frac{W_i}{D_i}$$
 (2)

The last stage is excluded since reducing its capacity improves robustness. WD ratio has three parameters: total stages *n*, depth D_i , and width W_i . To obtain valid models, we randomly sample from $n \in \{3, 4, 5, 6\}$, $D_i \leq 60$, and $W_i \leq 1000$. Fig. 2a-left shows the AT results of all samples. All clean and PGD accuracies show negative correlations with the WD ratio. Note when the WD ratio is close to 0, the AT is unstable and also leads to inferior robustness. We intersect the WD ratio of top 10% networks from each attack budget and find the optimal range of WD ratio is [7.5, 13.5]. We use error distribution function (EDF) (Fig. 2a-right) to provide the characteristics of models from within and outside of the optimal range. A marked robustness gain is achieved by simply re-distributing depths and widths to satisfy the optimal range. Compare to ResNet-50's WD ratio of 32, a robust network has lower WD ratio, which echoes previous research that deep and narrow networks are better than shallow and wide networks [20]. Furthermore, our WD ratio is not limited to 3-stage networks as ResNet-50 shown here already has 4 stages. Sec. 5 shows generalization to other networks.




Figure 2: (a) Clean and PGD accuracies are negatively correlated with the WD ratio. Each dot is a configuration of #stage, depth, and width. Intersecting each attack budget's top 10% most accurate configurations, we find the optimal range of the WD ratio is [7.5, 13.5] (with color backgrounds) and verify the significance by the EDFs of models within range (steeper dark lines) and outside of range (gentle light lines). (b) Performance of different configurations in stem stage and residual blocks. Differences are compared with baseline ResNet-50. All models trained with Fast-AT [46] and evaluated on full ImageNet validation set. Different PGD attack budgets show a similar accuracy trend, and the full results are shown in supplementary material Sec. B.1.

4.2 Convolutional over Patchify stem stage

As a preprocessor, a common stem stage "aggressively" downsamples input images due to the redundancy inherent in natural images. The stem stage in ResNet-50 [15] consists of a stride-two 7 × 7 convolution and a stride-two max-pooling. Built on ResNet-50, RegNet [36] replaces the max-pooling with a stride-two residual shortcut in the first block of the first body stage, dubbed *postponed downsampling*. On the Transformer side, the stem stage patchifies the image into $p \times p$ non-overlapping patches. It is implemented by a stride- $p p \times p$ convolution, with p = 14/16 in vision Transformer (ViT) [11], and p = 4 in Swin Transformer [26]. Both *patchify stem* and ResNet-style *convolutional stem* are applicable to CNNs and Transformers. As a pure CNN, ConvNeXt [27] borrowed the patchify stem from Transformer, and Xiao *et al.* [49] successfully employed the convolutional stem in ViT.

Inspired by these findings, we compare how patchify and convolutional stem affect adversarial robustness. We set p = 4 following Swin Transformer and ConvNeXt for patchify stem (Patch 4, Stride 4) and use postponed downsampling for convolutional stem. From the results in Fig. 2b, we observe both designs show better robustness than the baseline ResNet-50, but postponed downsampling is significantly higher than patchify stem. There are two differences between these two designs: a smaller stride and the overlapping region between two convolution kernels in the convolutional stem. We verify whether these two distinctions are beneficial to robustness. First, we reduce the patch size from 4×4 to 2×2 , and add the stride-two residual shortcut as in postponed downsampling to maintain the total downsampling ratio. This modification (Patch 2, Stride 2) improves PGD¹⁰-4 and clean accuracies of 4×4 patch by 0.23 and 0.98 pp. Next, we gradually increase the overlapping area between the 4×4 patch by decreasing the stride from 3 to 1. We observe a consistent increment while decreasing the stride, and the 4×4 patch with the largest overlapping between neighboring patches (Patch 4, Stride 1) performs almost on par with the postponed downsampling. Finally, we additionally experiment on different output channel widths since it barely changes

total parameters. Decreasing the width from 64 (ResNet-50) to 32 lowers the accuracy due to fewer model parameters. However, increasing the width from 64 to 96 boosts PGD¹⁰-4 and clean accuracies by 1.47 and 1.24 pp with a negligible 0.01M increase in total parameters. In summary, the convolution stem with postponed downsampling design outperforms patchify stem due to its less aggressive stride-two downsampling and overlapped convolution kernels. Besides, widening the output channels significantly improves robustness almost at no cost.

4.3 Robust Residual Block Design

4.3.1 Squeeze & Excitation

Squeeze and excitation (SE) block is a simple but effective add-on for the original residual block. It was proposed to adaptively recalibrate channel-wise feature responses by modeling interdependencies between channels [18]. RegNet [36] also verifies the effectiveness of SE on improving clean accuracy. However, Huang et al. [20] found that a straightforward application of SE hurts robustness on CIFAR-10, and added an extra skip connection around the SE. Driven by the discrepancy in clean and adversarial accuracies, we examine the SE block with ResNet-50. Note that the SE block will introduce additional parameters. Thus, we follow RegNet that sets r = 4 and appends the SE block directly after the 3×3 convolutional layer since it possesses fewer channels. Our experiments on ImageNet show a different picture, where the original SE block markedly increases all PGD and clean accuracies compared to ResNet-50 (Fig. 2b). We hypothesize that the different effects on CIFAR and ImageNet are caused by the reduction ratio r since Huang et al. only tested on r = 16. To provide a fair comparison, we train WRN with a sweep of hyperparameter $r = \{2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64\}$. Our experiments show that adversarial robustness is negatively correlated with r, and when r > 32, the accuracy is inferior to the baseline WRN. More details are in supplementary material Sec. B.2. Therefore, SE block is a unified architecture component that improves both clean and adversarial accuracies, and we set r = 4 in all designs that include the SE block.

4.3.2 Non-parametric Smooth Activation Functions

Both the *number* and the *function* of activation layers are different between natural language processing (NLP) and vision architectures. In terms of the number, Transformer [11] only has one activation in the multilayer perceptron (MLP) block. In comparison, the activation is normally appended to all convolutions in a CNN block [15, 16]. ConvNeXt [27] first observed this phenomenon and reduced the total activations from three to one in all blocks, which leads to higher clean accuracy. Inspired by ConvNeXt, We combinatorially analyzed all possible locations of the activation in a single block. The average PGD¹⁰-4 accuracies are 30.43%, 29.00%, and 24.84% when total activations are set to 3, 2, and 1, which are all inferior to ResNet-50. Thus, reducing activation layers is not beneficial to adversarial robustness, and we preserve the activation along with all convolutions.

In terms of the activation function, it is common practice to use ReLU in CNNs [15] due to its efficiency and simplicity. However, advanced Transformers, *e.g.*, BERT [8], GPT-2 [35], and hierarchical Transformers [25] adopted smoother variants of ReLU, *e.g.*, gaussian error linear unit (GELU) [17] and sigmoid linear unit (SiLU) [12]. Recent research shows replacing ReLU with its smooth approximations facilitates better gradient updates and leads to higher robustness [51]. For example, solely replacing all ReLUs with GELUs significantly improves the PGD accuracy of a standard ResNet-50 [2]. Dai *et al.* [5] proposed paramet-

ric activation functions by adding learnable parameters to non-parametric versions, which showed mixed performance on CIFAR-10 for different design spaces. Compared to SiLU, parametric SiLU (PSiLU) and parametric shifted SiLU (PSSiLU) show higher robustness when applied to WRN-28-10, but show degraded performance when applied to ResNet-18. Therefore, we examine and compare the robustness gain brought by GELU, SiLU, parametric ReLU (PReLU), PSiLU, and PSSiLU. We find that: (1) non-parametric smooth activations, *e.g.*, SiLU and GELU are significantly higher than ReLU (ResNet-50); and (2) for parametric activations, PReLU performs on par with ReLU, and both PSiLU and PSSiLU are inferior to SiLU. Synthesizing all the above findings, we recommend non-parametric smooth activations due to consistency and simplicity, thus replacing all ReLUs with SiLUs.

Table 1: A roadmap to robustify ResNet-50 by cumulatively applying our three design principles. We label the robustified version as **Ra**. **Ra** ResNet-50 significantly boosts the clean and adversarial accuracies of ResNet-50. Cumulative gains and robustified accuracies highlighted in bold. All models are trained with Fast-AT [46] and evaluated on full ImageNet validation set. Each configuration is trained thrice and evaluated thrice with different seeds (9 values in total). The standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

ResNet-50 \rightarrow Ra ResNet-50	#Param.	Clean (%)	PGD ¹⁰ -2 (%)	PGD ¹⁰ -4 (%)	PGD ¹⁰ -8 (%)
ResNet-50 (starting point)	25.7M	56.05 (0.10)	42.81 (0.22)	30.59 (0.15)	12.62 (0.12)
+ Depth & Width Config (Sec. 4.1)	25.8M	57.85 (0.16) +1.80	45.90 (0.26) +3.09	33.87 (0.10) +3.28	15.27 (0.05) +2.65
+ Convolutional Stem Stage (Sec. 4.2)	25.9M	58.00 (0.45) +0.15	46.59 (0.52) +0.69	34.90 (0.31) +1.03	15.85 (0.28) +0.58
+ Squeeze and Excitation (Sec. 4.3.1)	26.2M	60.22 (0.28) +2.22	48.95 (0.08) +2.36	36.43 (0.17) +1.53	16.43 (0.05) +0.58
+ Smoother Activation (Sec. 4.3.2)	26.2M	62.02 (0.03) +1.80	51.47 (0.22) +2.52	39.65 (0.27) +3.22	18.97 (0.14) +2.54
		Total: +5.97	+8.66	+9.06	+6.35

5 Adversarial Robustness Evaluation

We have completed the exploration of how individual architectural components affect adversarial robustness. It is encouraging to uncover how these components affect robustness, but it is not completely convincing unless the following two questions are addressed: 1) *Can these components consistently improve robustness when grouped together?* 2) *Are these design principles generalizable?* Sec. 5.1 provides a roadmap that robustifies a CNN with all three design principles, dubbed Robust architecture (Ra). For a model robustified with our design principles, we tag it with **Ra**. Then, we scale model architectures under diverse parameter budgets, extrapolate to the design spaces of ResNet [15] and WRN [53], train all models with various AT methods, and evaluate on CIFAR (Sec. 5.2) and ImageNet (Sec. 5.3) to verify the generalization of our design principles. Full comparisons with CNNs, Transformers, and NAS-based architectures are provided in supplementary materials Sec. **C** and **D**.

5.1 Combining the Three Design Principles

We robustify a CNN by applying our three architectural design principles. Specifically, we train ResNet-50 with Fast-AT [46] and use its evaluation results on ImageNet as the starting point. Table 1 outlines the path we take to robustify ResNet-50, and total parameters are generally controlled over the course of exploration. For the four body stages, we set

Table 2: Adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 against AA and 20-step PGD (PGD²⁰) with the same maximum perturbation ℓ_{∞} , $\varepsilon = 8/255$. Applying our principles leads to a consistent 1–3 pp robustness gain across AT methods, parameter budgets, and design spaces, boosting even the SOTA "Diff. 1M" and "Diff. 50M" AT methods proposed by Wang *et al.* [45]. Sec. C in supplementary materials provides a systematic comparison with Transformers and neural architecture search (NAS)-based architectures.

#Param.	Method	Model	Clean (%)	CIFAR-10 AA (%)	PGD ²⁰ (%)	Clean (%)	CIFAR-100 AA (%)	PGD ²⁰ (%)
26M	SAT	ResNet-50 Ra ResNet-50	84.05 84.91 +0.86	49.97 50.94 +0.97	54.37 55.19 +0.82	55.86 56.38 +0.52	23.78 24.99 +1.21	27.48 28.84 +1.36
	TRADES	ResNet-50 Ra ResNet-50	82.26 82.80 +0.54	49.91 51.23 +1.32	54.50 55.44 +0.94	56.00 56.29 +0.29	25.05 25.83 +0.78	29.91 31.87 +1.96
	MART	ResNet-50 Ra ResNet-50	77.98 79.60 +1.62	47.17 49.19 +2.02	52.70 56.47 +3.77	53.18 53.68 +0.50	25.35 26.97 +1.62	30.79 32.81 +2.02
37M	SAT	WRN-28-10 Ra WRN-28-10	85.44 85.52 +0.08	48.45 51.96 +3.51	53.13 56.22 +3.09	60.49 59.09 -1.40	23.64 25.14 +1.50	27.47 29.27 +1.80
	TRADES	WRN-28-10 Ra WRN-28-10	83.86 83.29 -0.57	51.79 52.10 +0.31	55.69 56.31 +0.62	55.21 55.38 +0.71	25.47 25.68 +0.21	29.34 29.41 +0.07
	MART	WRN-28-10 Ra WRN-28-10	82.83 82.85 +0.02	50.30 50.81 +0.51	57.00 57.35 +0.35	51.31 51.61 +0.30	25.78 26.11 +0.33	30.06 30.82 +0.76
	Diff. 1M	WRN-28-10 Ra WRN-28-10	90.61 91.32 +0.71	61.66 65.11 +3.45	66.43 68.93 +2.50	67.26 69.03 +1.77	34.26 37.24 +2.98	39.29 41.59 +2.30
67M	SAT	WRN-34-12 Ra WRN-34-12	85.92 86.50 +0.58	49.35 51.78 +2.43	53.05 56.04 +2.99	59.08 59.46 +0.38	23.69 25.18 +1.49	27.05 29.49 +2.44
	Diff. 1M	WRN-34-12 Ra WRN-34-12	91.11 91.75 +0.64	62.83 65.71 +2.88	67.53 69.67 +2.14	68.40 69.75 +1.35	35.67 37.73 +2.06	40.33 42.16 +1.83
267M	SAT	WRN-70-16 Ra WRN-70-16	86.26 86.72 +0.46	50.19 52.13 +1.94	53.74 56.49 +2.75	60.26 60.42 +0.16	23.99 25.17 +1.18	27.05 29.46 +2.41
	Diff. 1M	WRN-70-16 Ra WRN-70-16	91.82 92.16 +0.34	65.02 66.33 +1.31	69.10 70.37 +1.27	70.10 70.25 +0.15	37.77 38.73 +0.96	41.95 42.61 +0.66
	Diff. 50M	WRN-70-16 Ra WRN-70-16	93.25 93.27 +0.02	70.69 71.07 +0.38	73.89 75.28 +1.39	-	-	-

 $D_{1,2,3,4} = 5, 8, 13, 1$ and $W_{1,2,3,4} = 36, 72, 140, 270$ to control the WD ratio within the optimal range. The convolutional stem stage incorporates the postponed downsampling operation and widens the output channels to 96. Finally, we append the SE block (r = 4) to the 3×3 convolution layer and replace ReLU with SiLU. The clean and PGD accuracies of **Ra** ResNet-50 consistently improve for each modification, which verifies that our design principles work well both individually and collectively.

5.2 Evaluations on CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100

We apply all three principles to models within the design spaces of ResNet and WRN. Detail specifications of each robustified architecture are in Sec. E in supplementary materials. Table 2 presents the comprehensive evalution results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 against AA and 20-step PGD (PGD²⁰) attacks with the same maximum perturbation ℓ_{∞} , $\varepsilon = 8/255$. The training methods are SAT [29], TRADES [54], MART [43], and diffusion-augmented AT [45]. The diffusion-augmented AT is the SOTA training recipe proposed by Wang *et al.* [45], which augments the original CIFAR only with images generated by elucidating diffusion model (EDM) [22], so that no external datasets are needed. Since this training recipe incurs extreme computational costs [45], we train on the 1M generated dataset using batch size 512 and epoch 400, abbreviated as "Diff. 1M" in Table 2. In general, the gains are consistent across AT methods, parameter budgets, and design spaces on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Importantly, our design principles augment the improvements in network robustness achieved through better training schemes, boosting even the robustness of the SOTA Diff. 1M method by 1–3 pp. Our best model, Ra WRN-70-16, achieves 66.33% and 38.73% AA accuracy on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively. Due to limited computational resources, we only train "Diff. 50M" on CIFAR-10. Our Ra WRN-70-16 consistently outperforms WRN-70-16 and achieves the best performance on RobustBench [4].

5.3 Evaluations on ImageNet

Similarly, we also apply all three principles to models within the design spaces of ResNet and WRN. The training methods are Fast-AT [46] and SAT [29]. Table 3 presents the comprehensive SAT evaluation results on ImageNet against AA and 100-step PGD (PGD¹⁰⁰). The maximum perturbation for AA is ℓ_{∞} , $\varepsilon = 4/255$, and for PGD are ℓ_{∞} , $\varepsilon = \{2,4,8\}/255$. We observe a consistent 4–9 pp robustness gain across different model parameters and design spaces. Specifically, our Ra WRN-101-2, even with fewer parameters than WRN-101-2, improves the AA accuracy by 6.94 pp when trained from scratch with SAT.

Table 3: Adversarial robustness on ImageNet against AA and 100-step PGD (PGD¹⁰⁰). The maximum perturbation for AA is ℓ_{∞} , $\varepsilon = 4/255$, and for PGD are ℓ_{∞} , $\varepsilon = \{2,4,8\}/255$. All models trained from random initializations with SAT [29]. We observe a consistent 4–9 pp robustness gain. Full comparisons including Transformers and Fast-AT results are in supplementary materials Sec. D.

Model	#Param.	Clean (%)	AA (%)	PGD ¹⁰⁰ -2 (%)	PGD ¹⁰⁰ -4 (%)	PGD ¹⁰⁰ -8 (%)
ResNet-50	26M	63.87	34.96	52.15	38.96	15.83
Ra ResNet-50	26M	70.17 +6.30	44.14 +9.18	60.06 +7.91	47.77 +8.81	21.77 +5.94
ResNet-101	45M	67.06	39.78	56.26	43.17	18.31
Ra ResNet-101	46M	71.88 +4.82	46.26 +6.48	61.89 +5.63	49.30 +6.13	23.01 +4.70
WRN-101-2	127M	69.30	42.00	58.71	45.27	19.95
Ra WRN-101-2	104M	73.44 +4.14	48.94 +6.94	63.49 +4.78	51.03 +5.76	25.31 +5.36

6 Conclusion

We synthesize a suite of three generalizable robust architectural design principles: (a) optimal range for *depth* and *width* configurations, (b) preferring *convolutional* over *patchify* stem stage, and (c) robust residual block design through adopting squeeze and excitation blocks and non-parametric smooth activation functions. Through extensive experiments across a wide spectrum of *dataset scales*, *adversarial training methods*, *model parameters*, and *network design spaces*, our principles consistently and markedly improve adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet.

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